A Proposal of a Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance Research

Fernando Trambacos; Tatiana Albanez; Luiz Nelson Guedes de Carvalho

doi:10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a4

Autores

Fernando Trambacos Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8429-4522
Tatiana Albanez Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4471-6946
Luiz Nelson Guedes de Carvalho Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5011-2797

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a4

Palavras-chave:

teorias de governança corporativa, mecanismos do conselho de administração, mecanismos de propriedade, mecanismos do mercado de controle acionário

Resumo

Objetivo: O objetivo desse artigo é apresentar e discutir uma estrutura conceitual para a pesquisa em governança corporativa.

Método: O arranjo adotado decorre da nossa análise de algumas das estruturas conceituais de governança corporativa existentes, que apesar de relevantes, falham em criar consenso e estabelecer uma estrutura compartilhada.

Originalidade/Relevância: Entendemos que a estrutura conceitual proposta, além de original, é melhor estruturada e mais abrangente do que as estruturas existentes.

Resultados: A estrutura proposta parte da divisão clássica entre variáveis relativas aos ambientes interno e externo, dividindo o ambiente interno em três dimensões: (i) estrutural (relação principal-principal); (ii) dimensão (relação principal-agente); e (iii) comportamental (relações interpessoais). Todas essas categorias contêm discussões relevantes e permitem aos pesquisadores enxergar a governança corporativa como um todo integrado, com arranjos únicos para cada firma específica.

Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: Sob a perspectiva acadêmica, a estrutura proposta consolida o conhecimento gerado na área de maneira estruturada e permite uma interpretação harmoniosa e integrada das suas diferentes facetas.

Contribuições sociais/para a gestão: Sob uma perspectiva prática, profissionais e reguladores podem usar a estrutura proposta para ter uma visão integrada dos mecanismos de governança corporativa existentes, de modo a apoiar suas decisões.

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