A Proposal of a Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance Research

Fernando Trambacos; Tatiana Albanez; Luiz Nelson Guedes de Carvalho

doi:10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a4

Autores/as

Fernando Trambacos Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8429-4522
Tatiana Albanez Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4471-6946
Luiz Nelson Guedes de Carvalho Business School, University of São Paulo https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5011-2797

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a4

Palabras clave:

corporate governance theories, board of director mechanisms, ownership mechanisms, market control mechanisms

Resumen

Objective: This paper aims at presenting and discussing a conceptual framework for corporate governance research.

Method: The structure adopted for this framework derives from our analysis of some of the existing conceptual frameworks for corporate governance, which, despite their strengths, still fail to achieve a consensus and establish a shared structure.

Originality/Relevance: It is our understanding, therefore, that the original framework proposed in this paper is more structured and comprehensive regarding the current literature than previous frameworks.

Results: The proposed framework starts from the classic division between internal and external environment variables and then divides the internal environment into three dimensions: (i) structural (principal-principal relations); (ii) operational (principal-agent relations); and (iii) behavioral (interpersonal relations). All these categories contain extremely relevant discussions and enable researchers to view corporate governance as an integrated whole.

Theoretical/Methodological contributions: Under an academic perspective, the proposed framework consolidates the knowledge produced within the field in a structured way and facilitates a harmonious and integrated understanding of its different facets.

Social/management contributions: Professionals and regulators can use our framework to have a structured and integrated view of the existing corporate governance mechanisms, assisting their decisions in the elaboration of policies and recommendations.

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