Planos de Opções de Compra de Ações, Oportunidades de Crescimento e Desempenho: Evidências na BM&Fbovespa

Renata Tamirez Ramalho; Patricia Maria Bortolon; Marcelo Alvaro da Silva Macedo

doi:10.51341/1984-3925_2017v20n3a9

Authors

Renata Tamirez Ramalho Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Patricia Maria Bortolon Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo
Marcelo Alvaro da Silva Macedo Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2017v20n3a9

Keywords:

Employee stock options plans (ESOP), Growth opportunities, Performance, Corporate management.

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze how Growth Opportunities can influence the relationship between Employee Stock Options Plans (ESOP) and company development. The theoretical line of this study comes from the search to mitigate agency conflicts, thus mechanisms are necessary for the alignment of interests between organization managers (agents) and stockholders (principal), in order to guarantee company valuation. This article replies to and extends studies by Perobelli, Lopes and Silveira (2012) and Hutchinson and Gul (2006). Given this paper’s aim, the work method analyzes companies which had their stocks negotiated on at least 90% of the days when there was trading on the stock market exchange. The sample comprises 115 companies, between 2012 and 2014. The data were extracted from the Reference Forms (FR), available in CVM, and from the database Com Dinheiro. To estimate the models, panel data analysis method was used. Research hypothesis 1, in which companies use ESOP with a view to maximizing their development, was refuted. The tests showed that whether or not ESOP is used alone wealth is not generated for the stockholder, but quality in plan structuring, that is, when there is a distance between the exercise price and the stock price on the grant date (out-of-money stocks). Research hypothesis 2, which affirms that the effect of the presence of ESOP is influenced by Growth Opportunities, was accepted. Consistent data were found that performance calculated according to stock returns are positively influenced by Growth Opportunities. Further, the presence of ESOP, its Quality (QESOP) and Corporate Management (GC) expand amplify this effect.

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Author Biographies

Renata Tamirez Ramalho, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Mestranda em Ciências Contábeis pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

Patricia Maria Bortolon, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo

Professora Adjunta do Departamento de Ciências Contábeis da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, doutora em Administração de Empresas pela COPPEAD/UFRJ.

Marcelo Alvaro da Silva Macedo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Professor adjunto da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro no Departamento de Contabilidade da Faculdade de Administração e Ciências Contábeis (FACC), pós-doutor em Controladoria e Contabilidade pela FEA-USP.

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