Proteção Anti-takeover e Gerenciamento de Resultados: O Efeito das Poison Pills com Cláusulas Pétreas

Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo; Adilson de Lima Tavares; Anderson Luíz Rezende Mól; Raimundo Marciano de Freitas Neto

doi:10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4

Authors

Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo University of Sao Paulo http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0830-0214
Adilson de Lima Tavares Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7800-9473
Anderson Luíz Rezende Mól Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5915-8070
Raimundo Marciano de Freitas Neto Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3319-6260

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4

Keywords:

Poison Pills, Earnings Management, Anti-takeover Devices.

Abstract

Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.

Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.

Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.

Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.

Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.

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Author Biographies

Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo, University of Sao Paulo

PhD candidate in Controllership and Accounting from the University of Sao Paulo (FEA-RP/USP). Visiting scholar from the University of Texas (UTEP). Master's degree in Accounting from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Bachelor's degree in Accounting from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Member of the Research Group on Accounting Information - InCont (FEA-RP/USP) and Finance Research Group - GPFin (FEA-RP/USP). Publons Academy certified peer reviewer. Research interests in Financial Accounting, Corporate Finance, and Accounting Education.

Adilson de Lima Tavares, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte

Graduated in Accounting (1995) and specialized in Management Accounting (1999) by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Master's (2006) and Doctorate degrees (2010) in Accounting by the Multi-Institutional and Interregional Graduate Program in Accounting (UnB/UFPB/UFRN). He is currently a professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte. He has experience in the Administration area, with an emphasis on Management Accounting, working mainly on the following topics: accounting information, accounting and cost analysis and financial statement analysis.

Anderson Luíz Rezende Mól, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte

PhD, Master's degree, and Bachelor's degree in Administration. Associate Professor III at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte - UFRN. Supervised twenty-five Master's Dissertations and eight Doctoral Theses in the areas of Finance, Strategy and Quantitative Methods. Received 6 awards and/or honors. Author/Co-author of more than 50 articles published in National and International Journals. Associate Editor of BAR Magazine - Brazilian Administration Review and Area Leader (2017-2018) at EnANPAD (theme: Markets and Financial Institutions). Ad-hoc evaluator of national journals (RAE, RAUSP, BBR, RAC, BAR, BASE, among others) and international (Journal of Future Markets, Journal of Quantitative Finance, Journal of Corporate Governance, among others). Research interests focused on: Corporate Governance and Studies on Boards of Directors; Financial Econometrics; Volatility Models, Risks and Derivatives, Quantitative Methods Applied to Management. Professor of the Masters and Doctorate Programs in Administration (PPGA/UFRN) and Accounting Sciences (PGCCon/UFRN).

Raimundo Marciano de Freitas Neto, Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte

Bachelor in Accountancy, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte. Specialist in Social Security Laws, Universidade Potiguar. Master in Accounting, programa Multi-institucional e Inter-regional de Pós-graduação em Ciências Contábeis UnB/UFPB/UFRN. PhD in Management, PPGA-UFRN. Professor of Financial Management at Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Rio Grande do Norte. Former owner of Ermel e Freitas Contadores Associados. Member of research groups: Finance (UFRN), Contabilidade e Avaliação Econômica e Financeira de Políticas Públicas (UFRN) and Núcleo de Gestão de Negócios (IFRN). Member of Núcleo de Extensão e Práticas Profissionais do IFRN Campus Nova Cruz, taking part in projects for small firms.

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