Constitutionally Mandated Funds for Financing Regional Development in Brazil: An Analysis of the Compensatory Mechanisms Used by Financial Institutions (1995-2013)

Resumen

This paper examines the relationship between constitutionally mandated funds for financing regional development in Brazil and the regional financial institutions that manage them. These constitutionally mandated funds apply a fraction of federal tax revenues in the productive sectors of the North, Northeast and Midwest regions of Brazil. We investigate the occurrence of soft budget constraint on these institutions, induced by compensatory mechanisms for management of the resources of these funds (administration fee) and by the assumption of credit risk in lending (del credere). The concept of soft budget constraint, proposed by Hungarian economist Janos Kornai in the context of socialist economies, refers to the expectations for systematic bailout of economic organizations by governments or banks, usually associated with the paternalistic role of the state towards these organizations. Our analysis uses comparative graphics and spreadsheets. The results indicate more remuneration than administrative costs and credit risk assumed by financial institutions and confirm the hypothesis of legal parameters that induce soft budget constraint.