Descobrindo um Santo para Cobrir Outro: o gerenciamento de resultados em estatais brasileiras

Nadjara Davi Silva; Fernanda Maciel Peixoto; Flavio Barboza; Catarine Palmieri Pitangui Tizziotti

doi:10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a3

Authors

Nadjara Davi Silva Federal University of Uberlândia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0404-9210
Fernanda Maciel Peixoto Federal University of Uberlândia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0969-7567
Flavio Barboza Federal University of Uberlândia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3449-5297
Catarine Palmieri Pitangui Tizziotti Federal University of Uberlândia http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2892-0197

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a3

Keywords:

State-owned enterprises, earnings management, ownership and control structure, IFRS

Abstract

Objective:The accounting information can be manipulated in order to change the perception of the minority shareholders about the real situation of the firm. In case of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), they can have their wealth expropriated by the politicians and bureaucrats’ opportunistic behavior, which is an incentive to the earnings management (EM) practice. This study aims to analyze the state ownership effects on EM in Brazil, and investigate the link between EM, and ownership and control structures.

Method: Data from 2006–2015,for 250 non-financial Brazilian public firms, which covers 26 SOEs. The analyses are based on multiple regression methods with panel data.

Originality/Relevance:This study innovates by including in this analysis the interaction of state control with the excess of control rights over the ownership rights of the largest shareholders, and analyze the entrenchment effect. Additionally, addresses the EM both in terms of direction and breadth.

Results: SOEs tend to take on income-increasing practices, which persisted even after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, the IFRS adoption led to a reduction in the level of EM, in special the positive trend. Yet, the firms' market value and size are significant for explaining EM.

Theoretical/Methodological contributions: this study helps to understand the behavior of Brazilian SOEs, while reveals the SOE's political influence can induce greater information asymmetry and the control is more concentrated in there, which supposedly raises the risks of minority shareholders' expropriation. These results suggest the need for improvements in the transparency of these companies.

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Author Biographies

Nadjara Davi Silva, Federal University of Uberlândia

M.S. Business Administration, School of Business and Management - Fed. Univ. of Uberlândia

Fernanda Maciel Peixoto, Federal University of Uberlândia

PhD Administration, Center for Graduate Studies and Research in Administration, Federal University of Minas Gerais (2012), with international period at the Higher Institute of Economics and Management of the Technical University of Lisbon.

M.S. Administration, Fed. Univ. of Uberlândia (2005)

B.A. Business Administration, Fed. Univ. of Uberlândia (2002).

Professor of Finance at School of Business and Management - Federal University of Uberlândia. Professor of the Graduate Program in Administration (PPGA) of FAGEN/UFU, in the Finance and Controllership Line. Areas of interest: corporate governance, behavioral finance, investment analysis, financial planning.

Flavio Barboza, Federal University of Uberlândia

PhD Strategic Finance, Mackenzie Presbyterian University.

MSc. Physics, and B.A. Mathematics both in São Paulo State University.

Professor of Finance at FAGEN-UFU, where he works in the area of Risk Management, Financial Performance and Investment Analysis.

Catarine Palmieri Pitangui Tizziotti, Federal University of Uberlândia

B.A. Administration (2005). M.S. (2009) and PhD in Production Engineering from the Federal University of São Carlos (2013). Professor of Finance at the Fed. Univ. of Uberlândia. Member of the research centers NePFin (Center for Studies and Research in Finance) and NPExGPP (Research and Extension Center in Management and Public Policies).

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